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MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY AS A DUAL CAPACITY
OF AN EMPLOYER
N RECENT YEARS, a new theory of recovery for employees' injuries arising
out of an employment situation has emerged where the employer's product
is the proximate cause of the injury. In most situations the theory of recovery
for the employee would be workmen's compensation statutes with their
schedules which limit the amount the employee recovers. Recently, to
avoid this inadequate measure of damages, employees' attorneys have,
with increasing regularity, alleged that the injury arose out of a second
or dual capacity of the employer, unrelated to and independent of the normal
employer-employee obligations and duties.
By proving the dual capacity of the employer, the employee's amount
of recovery is increased, thereby redressing the employee's injury more
adequately than possible under workmen's compensation.
A total critique of pre-workmen's compensation common law and
recovery under workmen's compensation statutes is not within the scope of
this article, but a brief historical analysis is necessary to establish it as
background.
In order to hold the employer liable at common law, the employee
must prove negligence by the employer and breach of some specific duty of
care that the employer owes the employee.' The duties of care owed by
the employer have been narrowly defined by the courts and as a result,
the vast majority of accidents resulted in no recovery for the employee.'
The employee is further burdened in actions against the employer by common
law defenses and by the implied incidents of the employment contract.
Thus, by the employment contract the employer was relieved of common
law obligations' by either express provisions of the employment contract,'
or by the employee's decision to remain employed thereby assuming the
work place hazards. Even if the employee's injury was not caused by his
I W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971). See Mitchell, Products
Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 349
(1976).
2 W. PROSsER, supra note 1, at 526 nn. 91-95. The specific common law duties of the employer
were commonly classified as follows:
1. The duty to provide a safe place to work.
2. The duty to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the work.
3. A duty to give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably be
expected to remain in ignorance.
4. The duty to provide a sufficient number of suitable fellow servants.
5. A duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would
make the work safe.
aSee Note, 47 VA. L REv. 1444 (1961).
' Conway v. Furst, 57 N.J.L. 645, 32 A. 380 (N.J. App. 1895).
[747]
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assumption of the risks' and if the employer had clearly breached a common
law duty, the employee's action may still have been barred by his con-
tributory negligence. For a momentary lapse of caution by the employee,
the law penalized him by imposing the entire loss upon him despite the
greater negligence of the employer.6
The last major common law pitfall for the employee was the fellow-
servant rule, whereby the employer could not be held liable for the negligent
conduct of an employee's fellow workers.7 These affirmative defenses (the
fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk)
were known as the three wicked sisters of the common law and imposed
a tremendous barrier to the employee's recovery
The reluctance of the judiciary to modify common law concepts to
more equitably distribute the economic loss and to make the injured party
whole, resulted in the majority of industrial accidents remaining uncom-
pensated.' This refusal of the judiciary necessitated legislative action taken
in the form of workmen's compensation statutes drafted to reallocate the
burden of employee injury to the employer as a cost of doing business.1"
Prosser states that the theory underlying the workmen's compensation acts
is stated in the old campaign slogan: "the cost of the product should bear
the blood of the workman."'"
Workmen's compensation statutes charge the employer with all in-
juries arising out of business activities without recourse to issues of negli-
gence, resulting in a form of strict liability. 2 Under workmen's compensa-
5 The classic employee assumption of risk statement is contained in Boatman v. Miles,
I See cases collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 427 nn. 96, 97, 98.
27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933 (1921).
7 C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT 473 (1904). The employee was believed to be in a
superior position to fend for himself against the negligence of his coworkers.
8 See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 531.
9State studies of this problem resulted in findings that supplied the necessary impetus for
legislative action. Ohio's commission found 94% of the industrial accidents were uncom-
pensated. REPORT OF THE Omo EMPLOYER'S LiuBEarry COMM'N XXXV (1911). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 530.
10 State ex rel. Engle v. Industrial Comm'n, 142 Ohio St. 425, 52 N.E.2d 743 (1944).
"1 Prosser attributes this statement to Lloyd George. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 530
n.37.
22 1d. See also State ex rel. Munding v Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ohio St. 434, 450, 111 N.E.
299, 303 (1915), wherein the court said:
the theory upon which the compensation law is based (which is now generally accepted)
is that each time an employee is killed or injured there is an economic loss which must
be made up or compensated in some way, that most accidents are attributable to the
inherent risk of employment-that is, no one is directly at fault-that the burden of this
economic loss should be borne by the industry rather than by society as a whole, that
a fund should be provided by the industry from which a fixed sum should be set apart
as every accident occurs to compensate the person injured, or his dependents, for his or
their loss.
[VCol. 12:4
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tion statutes, the sole issue controlling the employee's right to receive
compensation is his status at the time of injury."3 The amount recoverable
is usually not at issue because most compensation statutes fix the amount
recoverable as a percentage of the average statewide weekly wage." Also,
the workmen's compensation statutes eliminate the three common law
defenses and relieve the employer of all common law duties of due care,'"
but the employee's cost for these benefits is the waiver of his common
law right to sue the employer in tort.'
If the employee is injured while in the status of "employee," workmen's
compensation laws would deem him covered under such. Once the statute
becomes applicable, the exclusive remedy provision applies." It is im-
portant to note however, that the exclusive remedy provision only abrogates
an employee's cause of action against the immediate employer; not against
a liable third party. This supplies the loophole for creative attorneys in
their attempt to find a "third party" to sue at common law allowing them
to supplement the inadequate damages provided for under workmen's
compensation.
The workmen's compensation recovery schedules are inflexible and
is Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923), wherein the Court discussed the
concept of employee's status at 423:
Workmen's Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of
implied contract . . . . The liability is based, not upon any act or omission of the em-
ployer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears to the
employment because of and in the course of which he has been injured.
14 This was the trade-off the employers made for their liability without fault versus the
possible large award received in the court system. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1970); I. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed. (1932).
15 See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 531. But see cases collected in W. PROSSER, supra note
1, at 533 n. 64 not favoring this result.
16 The exclusive remedy provision is included in all of the state statutes and is generally
phrased as follows: "Employers . . . shall not be liable to respond in damages at common
law or by statute for any injury . . . received . . . by any employee in the course of or
arising out of his employment . . . ." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973). See
also OHIO CONST. art. H, § 55 which provides:
For the purpose of providing a compensation to workmen and their dependents, for
death, injuries, or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's
employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory
contribution thereto by employers, and administered by the state, determining the terms
and conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom. Such compensation shall
be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or
occupational disease, and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided
by law, passed in accordance herewith, shall not be liable to respond in damages at
common law or by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease ....
(emphasis added).
The constitutionality of Ohio's Workmen's Compensation Act was upheld recently in Allen
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 50 Ohio App. 2d 216, 362 N.E.2d 665 (1976). See also Davis,
Third-Party Tortfeasors Rights: Where Do Dole and Suspan Lead?, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv.
571 (1976).
17 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10, at 135 (1970).
Spring, 19791 COMMENT
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are not designed to offer total restitution to the employee for all damages.
The recovery schedules do not include many of the classic tort measures
of damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish" or, since the re-
covery is tied to the statewide average employee's weekly wage, the im-
pairment of earning capacity. 9 Realizing the inequity of the recovery
when the negligence of the employer has been gross or "reprehensible,""0
a number of states enacted penalty awards to the injured employee.2'
The employee has generally been barred from bringing suit against his
employer for injuries received while in the status of employee. In recent
years the employee's sole and exclusive remdy has been workmen's com-
pensation recovery. The key determinant as to whether workmen's com-
pensation recovery is available is the employee's status at the time of
injury.22
By utilizing the underlying theory of workmen's compensation, the
dual capacity doctrine logically follows and results in situations where the
employer may be held liable as a third party. One authority has stated that,
"an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy
principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in
addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him
obligations independent of those imposed on him as employer. ' 23 The
second capacity of the employer is the basis for the employee's common
law cause of action, this theory not being defeated by the "exclusive remedy
provisions" of workmen's compensation statutes.2'
To date, courts have struggled with the application of the dual capacity
is See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 125
(1972).
'19 d. at 126.
20 "There have been numerous attempts and suggestions made to make the employees whole
again when the employer was grossly negligent or where reprehensible conduct may be
deemed moral negligence." A. EHRENZIVERG, TRENDS TowARD AN ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR
INSURABLE Loss: NEGLIGENCE wrrHOuT FAULT 16, 61 (1951).
Some states allow the employee his common law cause of action for intentional torts
as in Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694 (1963). See also Conrad
v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N.E. 482 (1923), where the
employee was required to elect between his remedies through workmen's compensation
award or seek his damages in tort through judicial process. But see cases collected in 2 A.
LARSON, supra note 17, at 153-64.
21 The penalty awards are given to employees when their employers fail to obey safety
rules. See OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35; see also, 2 A. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 70.20.
22 Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST.
MARY'S L. REv. 818 (1974).
23 2 A. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 72.80. For an additional study of the dual capacity doc-
trine see Comment, supra note 22. See also Mitchell, supra note 1 dealing with industrial
accidents caused by product liability and the effect it has on workmen's compensation laws.
2 4 See cases collected in Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 104 n.5,
137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 n.5 (1977).
[Vol. 12:4
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doctrine under various situations such as the second capacity of the em-
ployer as owner, or applying the second capacity theory when the employer
is operating another business, but still is only one entity.25 Perhaps the most
trying application of the dual capacity doctrine is in the area of product
liability where employees are attempting to hold their employers liable in
a second capacity as manufacturer.
One of the first cases arguing this theory was Lewis v. Gardner Engi-
neering," which resulted in a summary judgment for the defendant-employer
based on the grounds that the employee was limited to the exclusive remedy
of workmen's compensation since the "joint adventure is not a distinct legal
entity separate and apart from the parties composing it, and consequently an
employee of a joint adventure is an employee of each of the joint adventur-
ers."' 27 Therefore, the court held, the defendant-employer could not be con-
sidered a third party. The court further supported its holding by stating, "It
is nothing more than a coincidence that Gardner [defendant], one of the
joint venturers, happens to have manufactured the hoist. 23
The dissent points out that the majority sidestepped plaintiff's main
thrust, the dual capacity doctrine attempting to hold the employer liable
as "third party".29 Justice Fogleman, in the dissent, described the plaintiff's
action as not trying to seek
to recover for the furnishing of unsafe equipment by the joint venture or
the joint venturer. They seek to recover from appellee [defendant] as
a "third party" . . . on the basis of negligence or breach of warranty
in the manufacture and distribution of a faulty device, a step that
certainly was outside the purposes of the joint venture, i.e., the con-
struction of a lock and dam.30
Justice Fogleman further argued that the dual capacity doctrine should
have been invoked under the facts of this case, since not to do so would be
25 See Comment, supra note 22.
26254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973). A joint venture was entered into by Gardner
Engineering Corp. and San Ore Construction Co. for the construction of a dam. The
plaintiff-employee was a pile-driving foreman employed by the joint venture. The plaintiff
was injured when a hoisting clamp, allegedly defective, failed. The hoisting clamp was
manufactured and designed by Gardner Engineering Corp., and rented to the joint venture.
27 Id. at 18, 491 S.W.2d at 779.
28 Id. at 19, 491 S.W.2d at 780.
29 Id. at 20, 491 S.W.2d at 780. The judge quoted appellants' brief:
II. The defendant Gardner Engineering Corporation, as a joint venturer, is a "third
party" with respect to Gardner Engineering Corporation, as a manufacturer of the
hoisting clamp.
HII. The defendant should have been estopped from invoking the exclusive remedy pro-
vision of the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act in order to escape its liability
as the manufacturer of a product separate and apart from the joint venture.
80 Id. at 22, 491 S.W.2d at 781 (Fogleman, J., dissenting opinion).
Spring, 19791 COMMENT
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unconstitutional 1 and would ignore the clear legislative intent32 underlying the
statute. "Liability under the act is based, not upon any act or omission of
the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the em-
ployee bears to the employment because of and in the course of the em-
ployment."" He argued further that "[t]he purpose of the act is to compensate
only for losses resulting from the risks to which the fact of engaging in the
industry exposes the employee."'" Justice Fogleman's dissent points out
the need and rationale for the dual capacity doctrine, but unfortunately for
Lewis the majority found this second capacity to be just a "coincidence."
I. DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE APPLIED IN OHIO
In Ohio, the case of Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 5 while similar to Lewis,
was decided completely opposite to the Lewis decision. The plaintiff was
an employee of a stevedoring company and pursuant to a lease agreement,
drove trucks for Uniroyal, Inc. While plaintiff was resting in the sleeping
compartment of the cab of one of the trucks, the front tire exploded causing
a collision and injuring the plaintiff. The left front tire was manufactured
by Uniroyal, the defendant-employer. Since Uniroyal had control of the
truck drivers, the court held that the plaintiff was an employee of both
Uniroyal and the stevedoring company for the purposes of workmen's com-
pensation recovery."
The appellate court quickly handled some procedural difficulties en-
countered by the plaintiff in order to reach the "novel and difficult issue"
of the application of the dual capacity doctrine."' The court supported the
finding that Uniroyal, as manufacturer, was acting in a second capacity.
The court described the test to be applied as follows: "The decisive dual-
capacity test is not concerned with how separate the second function of
the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates
obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer." 8
The majority reasoned that, "the hazard was not necessarily one of employ-
ment, but was one common to the public in general . . . When the
initiating cause is not a hazard of employment, there is no casual con-
s, id. at 26-27, 491 S.W.2d at 783-84.
32 "It was never intended that our workmen's compensation statutes should immunize one
who happens to be an employer from any and all liability to one who happens to be
his employee." Id.
Bsld. citing McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1970).
'd. citing Birchett v. Tuff-Nut Garment Mfg. Co., 205 Ark. 483, 169 S.W.2d 574 (1969).
3549 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
36 Id. at 281, 361 N.E.2d at 494.
sT Id. at 282, 361 N.E.2d at 494.
3s ld. at 283, 361 N.E.2d at 495, citing 2 A. LARsoN, supra note 17, at § 72.80, who sup-
ported this position citing Constanza v. Mackler, 34 Misc.2d 188, 227 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
[V/ol. 12:4
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nection between the employment and the injury."" This court held, as
would have Justice Fogleman, that "it was only a matter of circumstance"
that the manufacturer was also the employer." The court was not disturbed by
the fact that plaintiff might recover workmen's compensation and also at
common law. It stated, "[m]ultiple recovery by an injured employee is a
situation which many employers find difficult to accept, but the concept
is not unique to workmen's compensation."41
In Mercer, Judge Wiley vigorously dissented, stating that plaintiff is
estopped from bringing a common law action on any other theory, and
that the dual capacity doctrine contravenes the law of Ohio."
[Tlhe immunity established under the Constitution of Ohio" and imple-
mented by the statutes" pertaining to workmen's compensation, and as in-
terpreted by the courts of Ohio, have created such an established doctrine
of law that any change so fundamental as eliminating the immunity
of the employer who complies with the statutory requirements should
be brought about only by legislative action and probably only by a
constitutional amendment."'
The dissent points out that the courts have liberally applied the exclusive
remedy provision granting immunity to complying employers and "[any
doubt, then, should be resolved in favor of preserving rather than abolishing
the statutory right of immunity."'"
The dissent seems to ignore the fact that it is the province of the judiciary
to construe the constitution and the statutes and that to abrogate or to
delegate this duty to the legislature would itself be against the laws of Ohio.
In this case the plaintiff merely sought the court's interpretation of the
39 49 Ohio App. 2d at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496.
40 Id.
"1Id. citing YouNo, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF OHo 42 (2d ed. 1971). See also
Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924)
(where the employee of an independent contractor was performing work for a corporation-
owner of premises received workmen's compensation from his employer, then brought suit
against owner-contractor for personal injuries and was awarded a jury verdict. The court
held that the owner was a third person and therefore liable.)
42 Id. at 287, 361 N.E.2d at 497.
• OHio CONST. art. II, § 35.
,4Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973).
45 49 Ohio App. 2d at 290, 361 N.E.2d at 499.
46 49 Ohio App. 2d at 290, 361 N.E.2d at 498. See Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 86 Ohio
App. 525, 93 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 153 Ohio St. 366, 91 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied,
340 U.S. 810 (1949) where it was held that the common law liability of employers com-
plying with workmen's compensation laws was abolished and employees are limited to the
exclusive remedy of workmen's compensation in every case where the damage arose out
of the employment, no matter how incurred, except if self-inflicted. See also Industrial
Comm'n v. Brosky, 128 Ohio St. 372, 191 N.E. 456 (1934), Lopez v. King Bridge Co., 108
Ohio St. 1, 140 N.E. 322 (1923).
COMMENTSpring, 1979]
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meaning of the words found in Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.74. The
majority construed the term "employers" and "any injury . . . received
. . . by an employee in the course of or arising out of his employment"
to mean that the hazard which causes the injury must be causally connected
to the dangers of the industrial employment.," Here the danger is one com-
mon to the general public and it was only a fortuitous circumstance that the
manufacturer was also the employer."8 This Ohio court has correctly held
that the employer can be held liable as a third party in a second capacity
notwithstanding the fact that it is still only one legal entity.
The Ohio Supreme Court had occasion to examine the Mercer holding
in Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co.," a case certified by the appellate court
as being in conflict with the appellate court rendering the Mercer decision.
Although the court did not expressly approve the Mercer decision, the
court did apply the dual capacity doctrine when the employee was injured
by a breach of an obligation owed by the employer which was unrelated
to and independent of those imposed upon an employer because of the
employment relationship. The Supreme Court of Ohio further held that
the employee's action is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
the Ohio Constitution or the Ohio workmen's compensation statute when
plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a breach of duty springing from the
employer's second or dual capacity. 0 The court reasoned that the statutes
stress that workmen's compensation is based on "the essentiality of the
status . . . by the usage of the very terms 'employer' and 'employee.' "51
The court further approved the rationale of related decisions. 2 The
court found "no compelling reason why an action should be less viable
merely because the traditional obligations and duties of the tortfeasor spring
from the extra-relational capacity of the employer, rather than a third
party. '53 The decision is carefully limited to imposing liability on the em-
ployer only when the obligations are generated from its second function un-
47 49 Ohio App. 2d at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496.
48 Id.
49 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978). Plaintiff was a nurse who contracted mercury
poisoning in the course of her employment at the defendant hospital-employer. The defend-
ant hospital treated her for these injuries, such treatment resulted in enhancement of
the injury by the alleged negligence in diagnosing her condition. The plaintiff conceded
that she has no action against the employer for the original compensable injury, but
asserts she may still sue for malpractice. These facts are remarkably similar to those in
Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
50 55 Ohio St.2d at 186, 378 N.E.2d at 490.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 189, 378 N.E.2d at 492. See 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8; Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S.
410 (1963).
58 Id. at 190, 378 N.E.2d at 492.
[Vol. 12:4
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related to its function as an employer."' The court does not base its decision
upon a one-injury versus second-enhanced injury distinction but correctly
bases the decision upon what obligation was breached by the employer.
It is also important that the employer involved in this case is only
one legal entity, thus leaving the door open for product liability cases
similar to Mercer. The injury in Guy occurred when the plaintiff was not
acting in the course and scope of her employment, although logical analysis
still allows the possibility that injuries occurring within the scope of em-
ployment might be generated from a second function, unrelated to that of
employer, thus allowing the application of the dual capacity doctrine. The
court's statement that the employer's capacity must be unrelated does not
imply that the act must be done sequentially, but that the act may be
simultaneously performed while acting also as an employer and still be
unrelated.
The Guy decision still leaves the path the Mercer decision traced
open for travelers. But refinement of dual capacity is being hampered by
courts obstinately refusing to analyze factual situations completely, their
apparent satisfaction with basic reasoning such as the classic "but for""
doctrine, and their further justification based on their fear of opening the
"floodgate to the docket."56
II. DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE
A recent California"7 decision has fine tuned the dual capacity theory
with a thorough study of case law both favoring and rejecting the doctrine. 8
In Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery," plaintiff was employed by the de-
fendant who was discovered to be the manufacturer of the defective scaffold-
ing which caused injury to the employees. The trial court sustained the
employer's demurrer to the complaints without leave to amend, whereupon
the employees appealed.
On appeal the court held that plaintiffs did state a cause of action
based on manufacturer's liability notwithstanding the fact that the defendant
was also plaintiff's employer and that the injury occurred in the course and
54 Id.
55 See Profilet v. Falconite, 56 IM. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069 (1977); Rosales v. Verson
Allsteel Press Co., 47 I11. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976); Neal v. Roura Iron
Works, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975).
58 See Meedham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 359 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); 47
Ill. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976); 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975).
57 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
581 d. at 109-10, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
59 Defendant was served as Doe XXXI where the complaint alleged Does XXI through L were
"manufacturers, sellers, distributors, designers, suppliers, jobbers, repairers, and owners"
of the defective device. Id. at 106 n.l., 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799 n.1.
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scope of plaintiff's employment, when "the product involved is manufactured
by the employer for sale to the public rather than being manufactured for
the sole use of the employer."6 The court based its holding on the dual
capacity doctrine stating that
[t]his is not a legalistic machination; nor is it "conjuring a non-employer
doppelganger" out of the manufacturer's activity. There is nothing ghostly
or fictional about two capacities. The dual capacity concept is within
the highest tradition of analytical jurisprudence. Dual capacity recog-
nizes the long accepted doctrine that every person is a bundle of rights,
no rights, liabilities and immunities. Which combination of jural opposites
or jural correlatives apply is dependent in the specific role assumed at
the particular time involved. While it may be that a defendant cannot
simultaneously be two distinct entities, a defendant can act in two
distinct capacities sequentially."
Using this reasoning, the court held that the employer, when acting
as employer, is granted immunity by the exclusive remedy provision, but
when an employer acts as "manufacturer of a product for sale to the public,
the employer assumes all of the duties and liabilities of such manufacturer"
and will be held to the same duty of care imposed on the manufacturer."2 The
workmen's compensation law allows the employee to sue third parties at
common law, thus, "a third party action should be no less viable because
the duty owned [sic] by the tortfeasor springs from an extra-relational
capacity of the employer rather than arising from another third party.""
Workmen's compensation gives immunity for "all of the hazards and risks
of employment which naturally flow from that employment," but the em-
ployee does not relinquish his rights as a consumer of a product.'
The court would not assume that the legislature intended to protect
the employer from the duties and liability of the product liability doctrine
developed long after the Workmen's Compensation Act, realizing that "[t]he
existing Worker's Compensation statute is not (nor was it intended to be)
a complete system of social insurance.""2 The court felt that it was only a
6o Id. at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
61 Id. at 110-11, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (footnotes omitted).
62 Id. at 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
63 Id. at 111, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802 citing Comment, supra note 22, at 832.
64 Id. at 111, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
65 Id. at 112, 137 N.E.2d at 802. But see Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369
N.E.2d 606 (1977). See also 47 Ill. App. 3d at 797, 354 N.E.2d at 561 where Judge Simon
argues in the dissent:
The Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted long before the Suvada doctrine [this
case imposed strict product liability upon manufacturers for unreasonably dangerous
goods] .... I therefore find no justification for imputing to the legislature an intent to
adopt a Workmen's Compensation scheme which permits an employer to withhold from
his employee the protection the Suvada doctrine requires a manufacturer to provide.
[Vol. 12:4
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"fortuitous circumstance" that the consumer was also an employee, and to
limit the employee's remedy in this circumstance would be against the
general rules attempting to "make the injured party whole" and the deterrent
effect would be eliminated so the manufacturer had no incentive to provide
safe products.6 The court limited its holding to employers engaged in manu-
facturing products for sale to the general public, thus the hazard is not
necessarily one of employment but is common to the public in general.6 "
To determine if an employer also has a second capacity as a manu-
facturer, the court developed the following test: If the product manufactured
and the defendant's activity in manufacturing it "is such as to justify the
conclusion that it is part and parcel of an activity which occupies the effort,
attention and time of the defendant for the purpose of possible profit on
a continuing basis," 8 then the employer's capacity as manufacturer is ap-
plied. This test at first glance would appear difficult to construe or apply,
but the court gave a number of hypotheticals in attempting to make the
standard more meaningful.6"
In Gallo Winery, the court correctly utilized basic concepts of juris-
prudence to invoke and apply the dual capacity doctrine. It held that any
one individual or legal entity has various vested legal rights at any one
particular time. The court then reviewed the basic purpose of the workmen's
compensation statutes and the legislative intent of their enactment and con-
cluded that the statutes were designed only to overcome the difficulties
encountered at common law in the master-servant relationship, thus the
status or existence of the employee-employer relationship and its corres-
ponding obligations are the only ones to be covered by the workmen's
compensation statutes."0 The court accommodated and amalgamated these
06 69 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
67 Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803. For a similar position see 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361
N.E.2d 492.
08 69 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
69 The court states:
A single or occasional disconnected act does not constitute engaging in such manufactur-
ing. The defendant who designs or manufacturers a product for his own use and subse-
quently does sell an extra one of the products to his neighbor or to a similar business
is not thereby subjected to manufacturers' liability when his own employee is in-
jured in using the retained product . . . . [M]anufacturers' liability clearly arises where
the plaintiff employee is injured in using a product designed and manufactured by
his employer primarily for sale to the general public and only incidentally used in
defendant's other activities. In between those extremes, the matter must be resolved
on the facts of the particular case.
Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
70ld. at 110-11, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01. The exclusive remedy provision "is part of the
quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some
extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is
relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 65.10.
See also 41 Ill. App. 3d 787, 798, 354 N.E.2d 553, 561-62 (dissenting opinion) where
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basic positions by realizing that the employer, in its capacity as manu-
facturer, caused the injury to the employee in the role of user of the product.
It then logically follows that the action would not be barred by the ex-
clusive remedy provision because the cause of the accident was not the
employment relationship but the employer's defective manufacturing activity.
There would be no justification for exonerating the manufacturer's culpable
negligence. The court allowed plaintiff to redress the wrongdoing suffered
and to make himself whole by claiming damages. Recovery for this type
of plaintiff will serve the ends of social justice in that it has a deterrent
effect against further damage to society since the manufacturer will now
have incentive to provide safe goods.
The manufacturer should not complain since it is in the best position
to guard against defects it initiated. Further, the manufacturer assumed the
liabilities by placing the product in the stream of commerce. The manu-
facturer may allocate the cost of product liability to the cost of goods,
which will ultimately spread the burden to the consumers. The rationale
espoused in Gallo Winery to support the dual capacity doctrine is both
logical and equitable and should not be swept aside by the swift currents
of justice some courts may utilize to clear their dockets by analyzing these
cases with the "but for" test.
III. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO SCUTTLE DUAL CAPACITY
A stumbling block which courts encounter in applying the dual capacity
doctrine appears when only one legal entity, the employer, is involved.
In these cases the courts' reasoning will sometimes stop in midstream, holding
simply that the mere separateness in the divisions of an employer's business
will not make the employer liable and that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is
the workmen's compensation recovery, simultaneously ignoring that a
separate and distinct obligation may have arisen from the role the division
or department played in the employee's injury.'
Justice Simon states, "I would not extend the quid pro quo justification for the exclusive
remedy provision ...to deprive an employee as a condition of an employment relationship
of the protection afforded him by the strict product liability doctrine." For the opposite
view, see the dissenting opinion in 65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125.
ri See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 72.80. For outstanding examples of this type of
reasoning see 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, which involved a product liability claim where
the plaintiff alleged the employer was a third party manufacturer. See also Hudson v. Allen,
11 Mich. App. 511, 161 N.W.2d 596 (1968). (The plaintiff in the course and scope of
employment was delivering a hamburger to a customer from the drugstore where she was
employed. While she was walking down the street, the door of a laundromat suddenly
opened and struck her, causing plaintiff to incur severe cuts. Unfortunately for plaintiff
the defendant happened to own both stores and for convenience kept both business records
in common and paid taxes for both under the drugstore's title. Plaintiff relied on the Duprey
dual capacity holding but the court distinguished Duprey as involving two injuries whereas
in this case only one injury was involved. The court stated that "the two operations realistic-
[Vol. 12:4
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If the courts fail to recognize the obligations which are different from
the usual obligations created by the employer-employee relationship, the
dual capacity doctrine will be effectively nullified in the product liability
area. Therefore, when the manufacturer of a defective product is also the
employer of the consumer or user of the defective product, and the product
causes an injury which arises out of the scope of employment, the manu-
facturer-employer may force plaintiff to forego his new common law rights
and accept his exclusive remedy of workmen's compensation. This "would
produce the harsh and incongruous result""2 of depriving an employee of
his common law rights. The United States Supreme Court avoided this
result by construing the compensation statute liberally and applying the dual
capacity rationale.7 3
The duties imposed on the manufacturer of products which are to
be placed in the stream of commerce are distinct from the duties of the
employer to provide a safe place to work and safe tools, since the hazard
of the manufactured product is a risk shared by the general public. This
distinction is clearly cognizable in the hypothetical situation where an
automotive assembly worker, in the scope of his employment, drives a newly
assembled automobile off the line and is rear-ended or backs into an ob-
struction causing the gas tank to be pierced (assuming it was defectively
positioned) thus resulting in an explosion causing the employee to be
severely burned. In this hypothetical situation only one entity is involved,
Fortune Motor Co., the employer, and the injury arises out of the em-
ployment thereby covered by workmen's compensation. If the court stopped
its analysis at this point and held that the exclusive remedy provision of
workmen's compensation applies, the employee and society would clearly
be damaged. The injured employee will not be made whole and society
is robbed of the deterrent effect of the award.
Analyzing these facts further, the court may find that the automotive
manufacturer enhanced the employee's injury causing a second injury.
The court may find that this "second" injury is also covered solely by
workmen's compensation if it does not analyze the legal obligation involved.
Upon analysis of the legal duties the court will most likely find that the
injury was one not arising out of hazards common to the general public.
This obligation which the manufacturer owes to the public is independent
ally represent a single unit with a single employer, and we do not find a dual legal per-
sonality." Clearly a separate, distinct legal obligation was owed to the plaintiff outside of
the employer-employee relationship.
72 Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1962) quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333
(1953).
7 8 1d. This case involved the Longshoreman's Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1927) subsequently
amended to expressly prohibit the dual liability, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (B).
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and unrelated to the obligations associated with the employer-employee
relationship."'
It may be said that when the court applies the dual capacity doctrine
in the products liability area that, "the court is doing nothing more or less
than carrying out an historic and necessary function of the court to bring
the law into harmony with modem day needs and with concepts of justice
and fair dealing."75
The courts have shirked this duty by pigeon-holing the various product
liability/dual capacity cases before them. The courts, fearing the opening
of floodgates, employ three major rationales on which to rest their decision:
the single entity theory; the "but for" related test; and finally "safe place
to work" test (tools supplied only for the employees' own use in their
employment).
The first of these rationales will clearly fall upon careful analysis.
While almost everyone will agree that "[m]ere separateness in the [em-
ployer's] divisions or departments is insufficient to establish dual capacity,"'"
the test cannot logically stop there since separateness is not required in
product liability cases when the employer-manufacturer may be held liable
for a defective product. The basis of the liability is its second capacity
and the obligations it owes to the employee-user.
Courts in both Indiana and Illinois have been in a constant struggle
with this theory since 1973. Some of their cases involve the plaintiff al-
leging dual capacity on the employer's part as owner of property. In
Marcus v. Green77 the court was able to find that the exclusive remedy pro-
vision did not preclude the employee from maintaining suit against the
employer-owner of the property. The facts were viewed in such a way
that actually two distinct legal entities were involved; the employer, James
Green d/b/a Jim Green Construction Co., and the owners, a partnership
consisting of James Green and Herman Schroeder. The plaintiff was in-
jured in the course of his employment, a fact which both parties stipulated
to.
8
In Marcus, the broad language of the holding adopts the dual capacity
doctrine although it has since been whittled away by subsequent decisions. The
74 This would be a logical extension of the rules laid down in 55 Ohio St.2d 183, 378
N.E.2d 488. These facts are analogous to those in 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492.
75 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 657, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9: (1969).
7, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800. But see Davis, Workmen's Compensa-
tion-Using an Enterprise Theory of Employment to Determine Who Is a Third Party Tort-
Feasor, 32 U. PrrT. L. REv. 289 (1971).
77 13 m. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973). The court relied upon 373 U.S. 410.
78 Id.
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same court only three years later limited the Marcus decision to factual
situations where there are separate and distinct entities."9 In that same year
another Illinois court was presented with the identical issue of an employee
attempting to hold the employer liable utilizing the dual capacity of owner.8"
This court found that no dual capacity existed and correctly analyzed the
obligation breached by the employer. The court stated that the employer
"occupied a position as plaintiff's employer and no other."81 In Walker the
court stated, "if the Marcus decision retains any viability at the present
time, it is limited to the principle that the Workmen's Compensation Act
bars all other remedies of an employee against his employer unless that
employer is existing as one or more distinct legal entities."'
The Illinois courts were subsequently presented with three more
cases involving the same issue: the second capacity springing from the
ownership of the premises.so In Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co.,8" the
court did not allow the owner of the premises to subrogate himself to the
position of plaintiff's immediate employer, a subcontractor, who did not
carry workmen's compensation insurance. Thus, the owner who paid the
plaintiff's workmen's compensation claim was also liable at common law
for his negligence as owner of the premises.
It is important to note that this case involves two legal entities so that
the dual capacity doctrine is really not involved. But the defendant's argu-
ment was that the exclusive remedy provision provided him with immunity
from an action for damages by an employee, the exact argument made in
all dual capacity cases, in this aspect relating to this article. Justice Kluczyn-
ski, speaking for the majority, answered defendant's contention by holding
that to allow the employer immunity would deny the employee the due
process and equal protection of law."'
This unique holding is analogus to product liability dual capacity
because the court determined that "the evil to be remedied by that [work-
men's compensation] act was that under the common-law rules of master-
servant liability, employees injured in the course of their employment had
to bear practically the full measure of their loss, hence a substitute system
TO Dintelman v. Granite City Steel Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 509, 341 N.E.2d 425 (1976).80 Walker v. Berkshire Food, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 595, 354 N.E.2d 626 (1976).
S Id. at 599, 354 N.E.2d at 629.
82 Id. at 598, 354 N.E.2d at 629.
83 Profilet v. Falconite, 56 In. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069 (1977); McCarty v. City of
Marshall, 51 IlL. App. 3d 842, 366 N.E.2d 1051 (1977); Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co.,
65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976).
8 See 65 111. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125.
85 d. at 447, 359 N.E.2d 125.
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of liability was provided."88 The applicability of this holding to the product
liability area is due to the fact that the strict liability doctrine evolved
subsequent to the Workmen's Compensation Act and does not involve the
evils encountered in the master-servant relationship discussed previously.
Thus an equal protection argument may add weight to the dual capacity
rationale.8"
A subsequent Illinois decision" adopted a narrow interpretation of
Laffoon as only conferring immunity from common law actions for damages
upon employers when sued by their immediate employees. In dissent, pre-
siding Justice Craven argued that the majority ignored the plain holding of
Laffoon which recognized the validity of the dual capacity doctrine." The
dissent cites a number of cases for the principle "that an employer cannot
accept the benefits of two positions and the liabilities of only one."90
In Profilet v. Falconite,' the employee brought an action attempting
to hold his employer strictly liable as owner and lessor of an unreasonably
dangerous product. The court held that when there is only a single entity
involved the exclusive remedy provision applies notwithstanding the strict
product liability charge. The court employs the "but for" test to show that
the injury would not have occurred except for plaintiff's employment. In
Profilet the court held that in Illinois an employee may not maintain an
action against his employer for injuries alleged to have occurred because
of the employer's secondary capacity. However, this decision does pass
muster because under precompensation days the employer was under a duty
to provide safe tools which was the only obligation raised under the facts
of this case. Hopefully the plaintiff also sued the manufacturer of the crane.
86ld. at 444, 359 N.E.2d at 128 citing Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 195,
106 N.E.2d 124, 133 (1952). The court gave the following example:
Two men are working on a beam which suddenly collapses injuring both men. The
first man is an employee of a subcontractor who has workmen's compensation insurance.
This man will receive compensation benefits from his employer and can subsequently
sue the general contractor . . who . . . is tortiously liable for his injuries. The
second man is an employee of a subcontractor who carries no compensation insurance
* ' * and will receive compensation from the general contractor.
Id. If defendant is permitted to be immune from the employee's common law action by oper-
ation of an exclusive remedy provision the court said this creates an illogical distinction
among the two employees. The classification must be based upon a real and substantial
difference in kind, which bears a relation to the evil to be remedied.
81 But see dissenting opinion, id. at 450-51, 359 N.E.2d at 130-32.
8 8 McCarty v. City of Marshall, 51 Ill. App. 3d 842, 366 N.E.2d 1052 (1977).
89 Id. (dissenting opinion).
90 Id. (dissenting opinion, see citations collected therein).
9' 56 Ill. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069. The employer supplied both a crane and the plain-
tiff to assist the crane operator to the lessee, a subcontractor. The boom of the crane
came in proximity with overhead electrical wires; it did not come in contact with them
but an electrical arc was created thereby conducting an electric current down the boom,
causing severe burns to the plaintiff.
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Illinois is not the only state struggling with this issue. In Strickland v.
Textron Inc.,9 a federal court in South Carolina failed to find a dual capaci-
ty in a product liability action. The machine which injured plaintiff was
manufactured by Talon, Inc. and installed in one of their plants. Subse-
quently Textron, Inc. acquired all the assets of Talon, Inc., which was then
dissolved. The plant which housed the machine became designated as
the Talon Division of Textron, Inc.: this division employed the plaintiff.
The court found that Textron, Inc. would be plaintiff's employer under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and then cited a long list of authorities for
the basic principle that doubts of jurisdiction must be resolved in favor
of the inclusion of employers and employees under the workmen's compen-
sation laws."
In rejecting the dual capacity doctrine the court relied on Kottis v.
United States Steel Corporation,'" a vague decision to be discussed herein.
The court in Textron did not analyze the factual situation completely. It
failed to discover if Talon, Inc. manufactured the machine for sale to the
public, thereby assuming the risk of being a manufacturer and the attendant
responsibilities. It is from this circumstance that the dual capacity will arise
and subject the employer to strict product liability, notwithstanding the
fact that the employee was injured in the course of her employment.
The employer and employee act simultaneously in a number of distinct
capacities. The quid pro quo principle of workmen's compensation was
meant only to protect the employer in the capacity of employer in his
dealings with employees in the master-servant relationship. It was not meant
to strip the employee of all her legal rights. This decision avoided this type
of reasoning by holding that plaintiff's injury was directly related to her
employment because it occurred during the course of employment. 5 The
"but for" doctrine again avoided complete legal analysis.
A. Quasi-Manufacturer Role of the Employer
The courts are not completely at fault or are perhaps even innocent
92433 F. Supp. 326 (D.C.S.C. 1977). The plaintiff was injured when her hair was caught
in the gears of a machine during the course of employment. She applied for and received
workmen's compensation benefits. Plaintiff then brought suit against Textron, Inc. alleging
that it was the supplier of a negligently designed and dangerously defective product.
93 Id. at 328.
", 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976).
9- 433 F. Supp. 326. Two other courts have adopted similar positions under analogous facts,
each court incompletely analyzing the facts by not making a finding whether the product
was sold to the general public. 359 N.E.2d 544 (relying upon and adopting Kottis v.
United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976)); Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp.,
150 N.J. Super 48, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977) (plaintiff argued the enterprise theory of liability
that a plaintiff employed by one enterprise and injured by another may still bring suit
against the "third party" notwithstanding the fact that both are divisions of a single legal
entity.) See also Davis, supra note 76.
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when the plaintiff fails to develop his product liability allegations in dual
capacity cases. The second or dual obligations of the employer do not arise
when the machine or product is supplied solely for the use of employees.
That was the common law duty of the employer at the time workmen's
compensation statutes were enacted. The dual obligations arise when the
employer supplies the machine or product to consumers, the general public,
and also supplies it to employees.96 A California court was quick to point
out this precise issue to plaintiff's counsel when they failed to allege that
the product involved was sold or placed in commerce other than to
employees.97 The court went on to correctly state that the supplying of tools
to employees is an integral and auxiliary activity to the firm's principal
manufacturing operation.98
A more difficult issue is presented where the employer purchases a
machine from a third party to install in its production facility and subse-
quently alters or modifies the machine. This factual situation arose in
Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co.,99 where the employee attempted to
avoid the exclusive remedy bar asserted by defendant.' Plaintiff stressed
that defendant, as "quasi-manufacturer" of the punch press, assumed a
dual obligation thereby being liable at common law. The majority opinion
avoided the issue by stating, "[t]he continued effectiveness of the workmen's
compensation scheme depends upon the continued ability to spread the
risk of such losses . . . . If employers are required to provide not only
workmen's compensation, but also to defend and pay in common law actions,
their ability to spread such risks through reasonable insurance premiums
is threatened. Any exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision . . . which
allow that provision to be circumvented must be strictly construed ....
Plaintiff argued that the risk was not one associated with the master-servant
96An employer-manufacturer really depends on the blind luck of the injured party being
an employee, thus limiting recovery to workmen's compensation benefits, rather than a
strict product liability action by an injured consumer where the recovery is designed to
make the injured party whole, such recovery having been designed to serve societal interests.
Fortuitous circumstances should not govern the law in these situations. See 49 Ohio App.
2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492.
9 7 Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975). The complaint did not allege that the employer manufactured the product as a
separate business enterprise, the complaint "admitted" that the machine was manufactured
for use by the employees during the course of employment.
98 Id.
99 41 Ill. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976).
100 Id. During the scope of his employment the plaintiff was injured by a dangerous condition
created by the employer modifying the two-safety control on a press, thereby becoming
a quasi-manufacturer of the press. The employee further alleged that the employer modified
the press for economic reasons and such act was willful and wanton. The employee also
accepted workmen's compensation benefits from the employer-defendant.
102 Id.
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relationship with which workmen's compensation statutes dealt, but con-
cerned the risk of being the manufacturer of a product. The court stated
that the employer does not sell punch presses, it only provides them for
employees, thereby being an incident of the employment relationship which
would not create legal obligations to the general public. 2 The court reasoned
that sustaining the dual capacity doctrine under these circumstances would in
effect abrogate the exclusive remedy provision for all employers when
they furnish tools to their employees. 3
This reasoning is incorrect because logically there are four situations
which would allow other remedies when the employer furnishes tools to
the employee. The first situation exists when the employer manufactures
tools for the sole use of employees; the dual capacity doctrine has no
application in this instance. A second situation exists when the employer
may manufacture tools both for employees and for sale to the general
public, thus assuming a dual obligation. Thirdly, the employer may purchase
tools from a third party, and if defective, the employee using them may
recover both workmen's compensation and from the third party at common
law. Finally, the employer may purchase tools from a third party which
may either be latently defective or not fit for their purpose and then modify
the tools making them unreasonably dangerous to the employee.
In the fourth situation, if the tool was hazard-free when purchased and
the employer modified it causing it to become defective, the employer
has robbed the employee of an obligation which the third party manufacturer
owed the employee.' By the employer's act in modifying or removing
a safety device, a defense may have been created for the third party
manufacturer. The employer's act may be considered as constituting an in-
tervening and superseding cause relieving the third party manufacturer from
liability.
In this fourth situation a number of inequitable results may occur.
A jury may slant the issues of defect and proximate causation when forced
to choose between a wealthy manufacturer and the injured worker. A
further injustice may occur in that once the worker recovers, the employer
will then be subrogated to the employee's action to the extent of his share
of any workmen's compensation payments made. Thus, the employer stands
a chance to be "rewarded" by his own wrongful conduct. Further problems
occur between the manufacturer and the employer in the areas of con-
tribution between the joint tortfeasors and exactly how the loss may be
distributed equitably.
102 Id.
108 Id.
'04 ld. (dissenting opinion).
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In Rosales the fourth situation was present and the court feared that
it would open the floodgates to the docket" 5 so its decision was rendered
without completely analyzing all four situations. The majority further re-
treated to the safe confines offered by the "but for" test.' The majority
also held that the fact that the safety device was modified for economic reasons
would not aid plaintiff. In the absence of a deliberate intent to injure workers,
the removal of a safety device "for the sole purpose of increasing . . .
production for greater increments and profits" is within the purview of
employers' acts which the workmen's compensation remedies were de-
signed to cover.""7
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Simon argued that the employer's re-
prehensible conduct of reconstructing equipment manufactured by others,
thereby increasing the worker's risk for the employer's profit, should make
the employer liable as quasi-manufacturer.' Justice Simon summed up
the fourth hypothetical situation by stating:
The characterization of any employer as acting in the capacity of a
"quasi-manufacturer" can be limited to instances where his own alter-
ation of tools or machines manufactured by others removes equipment
designed to protect users against injury. In these situations the em-
ployer should be held responsible to his employees if his conduct
makes the machine more dangerous than when it was manufactured.
I would not extend the quid pro quo justification for the exclusive
remedy provision explained in the majority opinion to deprive an
employee as a condition of an employment relationship of the pro-
tection afforded him by the strict product liability doctrine.'
The fourth hypothetical situation is so very similar to the pre-workmen's
compensation duties of providing the employees with safe tools that perhaps
only jurisdictions which have adopted the strict product liability doctrine
may make the fine distinction involved. Previously, the employee would
have to prove negligence in manufacture or design in order to hold the
manufacturer liable. Under strict product liability the employee must only
prove a defect exists and that the defect proximately caused his injury. In
the situation where the employer removes the safeguard and creates a
105 Id. citing 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837.
10 Id. at 790, 354 N.E.2d at 557. "Plaintiff's injuries could not have possibly happened
but for the fact that he was employed by defendant as a punch press operator." (emphasis
added).
'107Id. at 791, 354 N.E.2d at 558 citing Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 11 A.D. 2d 1041,
20, 5 N.Y.S.2d 919, affirmed, 10 N.Y.2d 718, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1960).
108 Id. (dissenting opinion), "I disagree with the majority in that I do not regard as an
incident of the employment relationship conduct of an employer which intervenes to deprive
an employee of protection the law obligates the manufacturer of a product to provide."
109 Id. To preserve the protection that the strict product liability doctrine offers, the dissent
would depart from the Santiago rationale.
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defect he robs the employee of the obligations owed by the manufacturer.
Can the employer withhold these protections owed to employees?
Workmen's compensation statutes were enacted to prevent the in-
justices the employee often suffered at the hands of the judiciary's inter-
pretation of the common law. Here the judiciary is again protecting the
employer from the emasculation of the exclusive remedy provision and pro-
tecting itself from its fears of a deluge of complaints descending upon it.
Will the legislature be forced to step in again to protect the employee?
B. Immunity when the Employment Relationship Predominates
One decision is often cited and relied upon for the principle allegedly
stated in its holding that the employee is relegated to the exclusive remedy
of workmen's compensation benefits where the employment relationship
predominates over all other circumstances in the causation of the injury.11
In Kottis"I the plaintiff brought suit against the employer in its capacities
as owner of the land and manufacturer of defective equipment. The em-
ployer was granted summary judgment by the district court from which
the employee's estate appealed. Analyzing this decision carefully, the au-
thoritativeness of the holding dissipates. Judge Tone seems to realize that
workmen's compensation statutes were meant to correct the injustices suff-
ered by the employees under the master-servant doctrine as interpreted by
the courts, but he then changes plaintiff's argument to be one alleging
only that the employer failed to provide a safe place to work, "one of the
most important grounds for master-servant actions at common law.'"
Perhaps the judge is correct in changing the argument as to the al-
leged "owner-dual capacity," but he defeats the reasoning of his own argu-
ment when he characterizes the alleged "manufacturer-dual capacity" as in-
volving the master-servant relationship. Clearly the duties imposed on manu-
facturers today have drastically changed since the inception of workmen's com-
pensation statutes. In fact, for the most part the manufacturer's liability has
been judicially created after the workmen's compensation statutes were
enacted.
The majority of state jurisdictions now apply the doctrine of strict
product liability, and a growing trend is to apply the enterprise theory of liabili-
ty. Keeping this in mind, the court's holding as to employer's capacity as
manufacturer is surely not supported by its statement that:
110 543 F.2d 22. The employee was killed while performing his duties as a craneman during
the course of his employment.
"'. Id. at 24. The court in a footnote pointed out that the district court found that the
employer was not the manufacturer of the equipment.
112 Id. at 26.
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The remedies of the act should extend to all situations where the
employee would have his remedy at common law if there was no act,
and the act should be so construed where its language reasonably
permits such a construction, since the general purpose of the act was
to substitute its provisions for pre-existing rights and remedies.113
Notwithstanding subsequent decisions which cite the Kottis decision
as "thoroughly analyzing and accurately applying" the exclusive remedy
provision,"" it appears that the court in Kottis felt that to decide otherwise
would devastate the workmen's compensation scheme, so the court refused to
pick up the guiding "lantern as they made their Erie way."''
One court has gone even further in extending the quid pro quo of the
exclusive remedy provision by holding that the employee's cause of action
must be entirely unrelated or only incidentally involved."' In Neal v. Roura
Iron Works, Inc., the employee, a drill press operator, brought suit against
the employer as vendor of work gloves claiming they were unfit for the
purpose purchased, such purpose being known to the employer-vendor.',
The court set forth a three-prong test for determining when the ex-
clusive remedy provision precluded the employee from bringing a common
law action: the first question is if the injury arose out of the course of
employment; the second, whether the action is for personal injuries, and fin-
ally, is the suit based upon the employer-employee relationship?" 8 The
court answered all three questions affirmatively thereby precluding the
employee's action. The court felt that to hold otherwise would emasculate
the exclusive remedy provision. 1 ' It seems that the quid pro quo rationale
in this jurisdiction would strip the employee of the protection of his implied
warranties in law when the vendor is also the employer and the injury
occurs during the scope of employment. Did the legislature intend this
result when workmen's compensation statutes were enacted?
C. Employee's Status versus Employer's Capacity
In a recent decision, Winkler v. Hyster Company, the court looked
"3 Id. at 24, citing North v. United States Steel Corp. 495 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
14 359 N.E.2d 544, 545.
15 Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1963). In Kottis the court ap-
proached the dual capacity issue as one of first impression, and stated that if the adoption of
the doctrine is to occur, "its author should be a court of the State of Indiana, not a federal
court, whose duty is to apply state law as it appears to have been laid down by the courts
of the state." 543 F.2d at 26.
116 66 Mich. App. 273, 276, 238 N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975).
117 Id. at 274, 238 N.W.2d at 838. The employee lost his arm when his glove became en-
tangled in the drill press.
l' Id.
11 Id. The accident could not possibly have happened but for the fact that he was em-
ployed as a drill press operator.
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exclusively at the employee's status and ignored the employer's capacity.'"
The court rejected plaintiff's theory "that the manufacturer of the equipment
created a duty to all who might be affected by its use, that it be free of
defect, and that without relation to his status as an employee, he was one of
those to whom the-duty was owed."'' The court felt that the employer
owed the employee a duty to provide safe equipment whether the equipment
was purchased or the employer manufactured it himself.'22 As so construed,
the plaintiff's action was determined to be only for a safe place to work
and safe tools to use. The court reasoned that the workmen's compensation
statutes covered this. This reasoning allows the employer-manufacturer im-
munity from a duty that a third party-manufacturer would be liable for
breaching. Such judicial legislating expands the workmen's compensation
benefits to the employer while the employee loses more rights. In Winkler,
the majority reasoned that the workmen's compensation statute abrogated
all rights, not only those which were in existence prior to the enactment,
but also those created after, such as rights arising out of strict product lia-
bility.ul If the courts are allowed to give employers immunity to all newly
developed causes of action and rights of employees the legislative balance
will be forever lopsided in favor of employers. The legislature clearly never
intended this result and the courts should not imply such a result except
where there is clear legislative intent to do so.
CONCLUSION
The arguments for the dual capacity doctrine merit approval and the
arguments rejecting the doctrine fail because of their incomplete legal
analysis. The doctrine's application to product liability cases is evident
because of the employer's manifest distinct obligations involved. Complete
factual analysis is required in the product liability arena, but the analysis
creates the same burden required of the courts by many other types of
cases. The courts' fear of opening the floodgates to the docket should not
override the courts' duty to decide these cases justly and logically. The situ-
ation where the employee claims to have been injured by a product which
the employer-manufacturer has produced for sale to the general public should
arise infrequently. Thus, the courts' fear should be allayed.
120 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606. The employee was injured during the course of
his employment when cargo fell from a fork lift truck upon him. The truck was manu-
factured in the ordinary course of business for sale to the public. Plaintiff asserted that
the fork lift was defectively designed.
121 Id. The court reviewed Gallo Winery but was not persuaded by its reasoning.
122 Id.
123 Id. But see dissenting opinion quoting Moushon v. Nat'l Garages, Inc., 9 Il. 2d 407,
411, 137 N.E.2d 842, 844, appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 905 (1956). "The act was designed
as a substitute for previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover
the whole ground of liabilities of the master, and it has been so regarded by all courts."
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Furthermore, the dual capacity doctrine will benefit the needs of society
when applied in the product liability situation, in that the manufacturer will
not escape his culpable conduct. The mere circumstance that one of his
employees suffered injury rather than a consumer should not allow a
manufacturer to escape liability. Legal reasoning should govern these situ-
ations instead of a plaintiff's blind luck.
JoHN D. LAMBERT
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